

Captain *GASCOIGNE*'s
ANSWER

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TO A
PAMPHLET
ENTITLED
Admiral *MATHEWS*'s
REMARKS

ON THE
Evidence given, and the Proceedings
had, on his TRIAL, &c.

As far as it relates to his TESTIMONY
therein mentioned.

In a LETTER addressed to the PRESIDENT of
the late COURT-MARTIAL held at *Deptford*.

L O N D O N:

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Capt. *Gascoigne's* ANSWER
TO

A Pamphlet, intitl'd Admiral MATHEWS's
Remarks on the Evidence given, and
the Proceedings had, on his TRIAL,
&c.

S I R,



HAVING read a Pamphlet, intitl'd
“ Admiral *Mathews's* Remarks on
“ the Evidence given, and the
“ Proceedings had, on his Trial,
“ and relative thereto ;” wherein
the Author appears to have been misinformed, or
to have intirely misapprehended some Parts of my
Testimony ; and to have cavill'd with other Parts
of it, as if they were inconsistent in themselves,
or had been contradicted by others ; and although

the Honour and Abilities of the Members of the Court-Martial, under whose Determination the Admiral's Case lay, and of which, Sir, you were the President, secure me from all Apprehensions, that such a Court, either would, or could be deceived, or amused from the strictest Scrutiny into, and Adherence to the Truth, by any Misrepresentations whatsoever; and assure me, that on comparing what the *Remarks* make me to have said, with what I really did say, according to the most authentic Minutes, those Parts of the *Remarks*, which represent my Testimony as inconsistent with itself, or as having been contradicted by that or the other Evidences for the Crown, therein mentioned, must appear to be unjust, and intirely without Foundation.

YET, as these *Remarks* are in Print, address'd to the Court, and may hereafter be made publick, (altho' at present the Publisher's Name is conceal'd, and the Pamphlet is not to be bought, but is said to be put into the Hands only of particular Persons, as if they, and Multitudes of others, by their means, were intended to be privately influenced thereby) I think myself under an indispensable Necessity to vindicate my Reputation, from the Reflections cast upon me by the Author: For surely an Endeavour to invalidate, or falsify the Testimony of an Evidence given upon Oath, is the most violent Attack, that can be made on the Character of an honest Man; and, if attempted without just Grounds,

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(as I doubt not to make appear, is the Case in question) is the greatest Injury that can be offer'd. And therefore, as there can be no determining equitably, without knowing what is to be said on both Sides, and as there is no Possibility of any other Chance, for this my Answer ever coming to the Hands of the reasonable Men, to whom that Pamphlet hath been deliver'd, than by publishing this Letter; I find myself obliged, in answer to such Parts of the *Remarks* as relate immediately to me, to say as follows:

First, THE Author of the *Remarks* says, (Pag. 11) That I am pleas'd to say positively, that I know the *Marlborough* was not relieved by any Ship.

Answer. As I know of no other Way of relieving a Ship, hard press'd in Action by an Enemy, but by going in between them, so as to take the Enemy's Fire off from the Ship in Distress; I shall always continue to be very positive (of what I saw) that the *Marlborough*, tho' apparently in the greatest Distress, was not relieved by any Ship in the Fleet; and therefore neither Captain *Stepney*, (in Pag. 11, 30, 31, of the *Remarks*) nor any other Evidence, doth, or can contradict me.

Secondly, (Pag. 12) THAT I also say, the Signal was made to leave off Chace on the 13th of
February,

February, when the Vice-Admiral and his Division made the Enemy's Ships plain from their Decks, and gain'd so fast on them as to make their Hulls in two Hours; and that, though the Enemy were at least four Leagues from the Vice-Admiral, I saw the Hull of the *Real* with my naked Eye; but observes, that none other of the Sixty-two Evidences examined against the Admiral, pretend to have seen the Hulls of the Enemy, except *John Coleman*, a Foremast-man of the *Neptune*, who says he saw some from the Main-top-mast-head, but never from the Deck, tho' his Ship was a-head of me; and except *Lisle* the Mate of the *Russel*, who says he saw some of them, tho' at seven or eight Leagues distance.

Answer. I NEITHER do, nor ever did, pretend to answer for what any other Person did, or did not see, or pretend to see, or to remember: But I do again, and shall for ever affirm, That at half an Hour past Six in the Morning, on the 13th of *February*, when I repeated the Vice-Admiral's Signal for seeing Ships, more than his Majesty's Fleet, first Eight Sail, and afterwards (as the Day-light came on) more of the Enemy's Ships to the Number of One and Twenty; several of my Officers and People call'd down from both the Mast-heads, and told me they counted that Number. At Seven Mr. *Wells*, one of my Lieutenants, told

told me, he saw them from the Fore-yard ; soon after, Lieutenant *Bucknell* told me, he saw them from the Poop ; from whence I saw them then myself.

THAT at Eight (which was an Hour before the Signal was made to give over Chace) I saw them from the Quarter-Deck of the *Torbay*, as did many other Officers and People about me, as they said, and I had no Reason to doubt.

AND at Nine, when the Signal was made to give over Chace, I saw Part of the *Real's* Hull above the Horizon with my naked Eye, whatever the Distance might be.

NOR can I apprehend it to be any thing extraordinary, from the Height of the Eye of a Man standing upon the Quarter-deck of a three-deck'd Eighty-gun Ship, to see Part of the Hull of a First Rate, at four Leagues distance, in fair Weather.

BUT it seems to be very extraordinary, that the Author of the *Remarks*, after observing (Pag. 12.) " That none other of the sixty-two Evidences pretend to have seen the Hulls of the Enemy that Day, except *Coleman* and *Lisle*," (instead of going on with his Attempt, to prove any thing in Abatement of the Validity of this Part of my Testimony,) should so flatly contradict himself,

himself, as by offering the strongest Proof imaginable to support and confirm mine, by the Testimony of *John Thomas*, Midshipman in the *Romney*, who (Pag. 40.) “ says, that on the 13th he saw “ the Enemy’s Hulls from the Forecastle :” The *Romney*’s Forecastle, being little more than half the Height of the *Torbay*’s Quarter-Deck, from the Water.

AND also, that, instead of confuting another Part of my Testimony (Pag. 12.) “ That the Signal was made on the 13th, when the Vice-Admiral and his Division made the Enemy’s Ships “ plain from their Decks” (who, it is to be remember’d, were then the headmost Ships of the *British* Fleet, and nearest to the Enemy.) The Author should confirm my Testimony of this Particular, by that of *Mr. Wilce*, Master of the *Sterling-Castle*, who says (Pag. 38.) that “ he saw two or “ three Sail of the Enemy on the 13th in the “ Morning, from the Quarter-Deck of the *Sterling-Castle* :” Which, as that Ship was, then, by her proper Situation, the very Sternmost of all the *British* Fleet, and most distant from the Enemy, is the strongest Proof that could be offered, that the Enemy’s Ships were then, not only to be seen from the Decks of the Vice-Admiral and his Division ; but also, by certain Consequence, from the Deck of every other Ship in the whole *British* Fleet from the Headmost to the Sternmost.

NOR is what the Author of the *Remarks* hath thought proper to recite of *John Coleman's* Testimony (Pag. 12.) That, " he saw some" (*viz.* of the Hulls of the Enemy) " from the Maintop-mast-head, but never from the Deck : " And again, (Pag. 46.) That, " he don't pretend to have seen " the Enemy's Hulls in the *Neptune*, any lower " than from the Mast-head on the 13th" to be understood, as any Sort of Contradiction to what is remark'd to have been said, either by Mr. *Thomas*, or by me ; as to seeing their Hulls upon Deck ; as *Coleman's* saying he never saw their Hulls from the Deck of the *Neptune*, seems rather to be an evasive Answer, than a sufficient one, to prove or imply, that he ever endeavour'd to see them from the Deck, and could not. Which is as full and serious an Answer, as the rest of the Author's sophistical Cavillings against any Part of my Testimony, seems either to require, or deserve ; except the plain Word, *Contradiction* ; which I shall be under a Necessity of speaking to again, in order to explain the Meaning of my own Words ; since I find such plain Words, upon so plain and obvious an Occasion, can possibly stand in need of an Explanation.

BUT to return to *John Coleman* : That he saw the Enemy's Hulls at the Mast-head, seems to be allowed : And, that Mr. *Lisle* Mate of the *Ruffel* (the very Ship where the Admiral himself then was,

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and

and which was then by a very considerable Distance farther from the Enemy than the *Torbay* was) saw the Enemy on the 13th from the Mast-head. And moreover, that he, by the Captain's Orders went and acquainted the Admiral of it; and "that he saw their Hulls," appears by what the Author of the *Remarks* hath recited of Mr. *Lisle's* Testimony (Pag. 23, 24.) to be a positive, and certain Proof of the Fact: That he there, as well as *John Coleman* at the *Neptune's* Mast-head, did see the Hulls of the Enemy.

AND therefore the Enemy's Hulls being seen even from those Heights, at, or before the Time of giving over Chace, which could not be seen from the same Heights, upon the first Discovery of their Ships in the Morning, nor afterwards at Sun-rising, (with an equal Degree of Clearness in the Weather) must surely be allowed to be as a strong a Proof, that the *British* Fleet did all that while gain upon the Enemy, as can be expected, or could be offer'd.

AND if Mr. *Thomas's* Testimony, as above-mentioned (Pag. 40. of the *Remarks*) is not a full, plain, and positive Proof of the Fact, That the Enemy's Hulls were seen on the 13th, from a Station much lower than the *Torbay's* Quarter-Deck; there can be no such Thing as a plain, clear, positive Proof by Evidence.

NOR

N O R do I apprehend, that the Distances, which Mr. *Lisle* and Mr. *Thomas* are said to have seen the Enemy's Hulls at, can by any means lessen the Credibility of their Evidence; as the Distance of any two Ships or Fleets in the Sea, one from the other, whilst they are both in Motion, must always be meerly conjectural, (as you very well know Sir,) there is no Possibility of knowing it with Certainty: And even in the Distance of fix'd Objects, as Head-lands (tho' ever so well known) hardly any two Men agree in their random Guesles at it, from a Ship moving in the Sea, but very often differ in their Opinions of it so much, that one of them takes it to be twice as far off as the other.

F O R which Reason it hath been usual (where a due Care is taken in the exact keeping of a Ship's Reckoning) never to depend on such uncertain Guesles for the Distance of the Land, which we either take our Departure from, or that which we fall in with: But the exact Distance is found and proved in both Cases, by laying down the Bearings of it taken by the Compass, at two different Times, with a proper Space one from the other, in an oblique plain Triangle.

B U T lastly, if it could possibly have so happened in the Course of the Proceedings, that my

Testimony as to this Point, had not been supported and confirmed by the legal positive Proofs above-mentioned; and that I had been really left alone, as the Author of the *Remarks* (Pag. 45.) seems desirous to have it imagined; I think that the bare stating of the Case, as to the Condition and Situation of our Fleet, and that of the Enemy's for the whole Morning of the 13th, would be sufficient to enable the Fact to carry its own Proof with it.

FOR had not the *British* Fleet had a whole Day and two whole Nights (and the greatest Part of the Nights Moon-light) to secure their Masts, and repair whatever Damages those Ships (that were near enough to receive any,) might have sustained in the Action, so that in the Morning they appeared to be all in good Plight, and as good Condition for Service as ever, except the poor *Marlborough*, which was taken proper Care of; and the *Namure*, which was then (by the Admiral's Flag being shifted from her to the *Ruffel*) supposed to have suffered extreamly, either by her Hull being torn to Pieces, or by Loss of Men; altho' her Masts were all standing, and she seemed to hold Way with the rest of the Fleet, and to keep her Station very well from Day-light the next Morning after the Engagement.

AND

AND was not the Enemy's Fleet so near at their being first seen on the 13th, that above twenty Sail of them were counted before the Sun was up; and that we could afterwards see four Ships among them which seem'd to be disabled, and discern one of them to be the *Real* without a Yard across, and in tow of a Ship which must be much below her own Weight; and that they were not yet abandon'd by their Fleet, who were two Hours and a half after we forbore to pursue the Chace of them, (by our bringing to, in obedience to the Admiral's Command by Signal) before they could get out of our Sight.

NOW whether our Fleet could possibly give Chace to them for full two Hours, with so much Wind that our Ships were obliged to keep their Top-sails reef'd, though going large, (Pag. 37. of the *Remarks*) and under such other Circumstances on our Side and theirs, as are above-mentioned, and yet, we not raise them enough to see their Hulls? may be submitted to the Judgment of any reasonable Man.

Thirdly, THE Author of the *Remarks* (Pag. 12) aims at finding an Inconsistency in my Testimony, by alledging that I said, it was impossible that the *Namur* haul'd off for fear of being boarded by the *Marlborough*; and that immediately afterwards I
say

say that I do not know what was the first Cause of her hauling off.

Answer. Instead of which, I believe it may be found upon Enquiry, that I said it was impossible for the *Namur* to be got so far from the *Marlborough*, as she was when I first saw her after she had hauled off from the *Real*, for fear of being boarded by the *Marlborough*.

BECAUSE, when I first saw the *Namur* clear of the Smoke, she was to the best of my Judgment, then, already quite out of Gun-shot from the *Marlborough*, who alone still continued closely engaged with the *Real* and her Second a-stern, and still the *Namur* kept hauling further off close by the Wind, till she was hid from my Sight by my Sprit-sail: And I was confirm'd in this Opinion of her Distance, at my first seeing her, by the *Namur*'s Stern being towards the *Real*, and yet she did not then, nor afterwards, fire any of her Stern-chace Guns at the *Real*. And that I did not know what was the first Cause of the *Namur*'s hauling off, is very certain; for as I saw that her Masts were all standing, her Yards braced up sharp, and her Sails well trim'd close upon a Wind, no Cause for her hauling off appear'd to me; and therefore, as I imagined that nothing but the utmost Distress, could oblige the Admiral to abandon the *Marlborough*, and leave that single Ship to bear
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the whole Fire of the *Real* of 114 Guns, and her Second of 64; and more especially, as there was no other Ship of the Enemy's but those two, near enough either then or afterwards, to reach the *Marlborough* at all with their Shot; nor ever to reach the *Namur* till after the Fireship was blown up, and the Admiral had wore in the Evening.

I THEREFORE concluded, that if the Admiral was neither slain nor much wounded, the *Namur* must have lost so great a Number of Men, or have received so much Damage in her Hull, that, as the Ships station'd next a-stern of the *Marlborough*, did not bear down to form and close the Line of Battle with the *Namur* and the *Marlborough*, when the Admiral was first engaged, the Admiral (in the *Namur*) must have been obliged to haul up to them, to shift his Flag and save the People that were left.

BUT when I found that no Ship, either with the Flag or without it, did bear down, either to relieve the poor *Marlborough* or to cover the Fireship, I concluded the Admiral was kill'd, or mortally wounded, and that there had been a great Slaughter amongst the rest of the commanding Officers in that Ship; until I saw the Admiral in the *Namur* ware in the Evening, after the Fireship was blown up, and with some other Ships of his Division stand to the Northward, on the Star-board-

board-Tack from the main Body of the Enemy; who had tack'd and were standing towards us.

AND as that Waring in little Wind and a great Swell, carried the Admiral and those Ships who were nearest to him, pretty near the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy, (who were continuing their way to the Southward to join their Admiral in the *Real*) then, and not till then, was any of the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy's Fleet, ever near enough to the *Namur* for their Shot to reach her; and the Firing then, continued but a very short time in passing each other on contrary Tacks.

AND that the Admiral and his Division then pass'd to windward of the Enemy, was manifest; by their firing at the Enemy with their Larboard-guns, and they at him and the Ships nearest to him, with their Larboard-guns only.

Fourthly, (Pag. 12) That I assert that no Ship went down to cover the Fireship; nor could without my having seen her; whereas Captain *Stepney* says, the *Namur* follow'd the Fireship down; and *Samuel Borthall*, Boat-swain of the Fireship, (another of the Evidences against the Admiral) says, he saw the *Namur* engaged with the *Real* when the Fireship was going down: And that the *Namur* continued to fire

“ fire at her, till after the Fireship blew up, and
 “ to the time her Men got on board the *Dor-*
 “ *setshire.*”

Answer. THAT no Ship went down to cover the Fireship, nor could without my seeing her, I shall for ever insist upon; according to my Opinion of the Duty of the Ship appointed to perform that Service; which is to lead, and keep between the Fireship and the Ship intended to be burnt by her; that, through the Smoke of the covering Ship's Fire, the Enemy may not possibly see to fire at the Fireship, till she is near enough not to miss grappling; and by this means, the covering Ship would also be close at hand to take up the Fireship's last Boat, with the Captain and all the People who remain'd with him to the boarding of the Enemy: And therefore, following a Fireship can with no sort of Propriety (as I apprehend) be call'd covering her.

AND moreover, that no Ship follow'd her so as to be of any Use at all to her, is to me altogether as certain, as that no Ship went down a-head of her: For my Eye was never off of the Fireship, from the Moment she came open to Leeward of my Sails till she blew up; which (as the *Real* bore away from her, and there was but little Wind) was above half an Hour; in all which time, no Ship whatever of the *British* Fleet did follow her

far enough to Leeward to come open of my Head-fails; nor was there any Smoke during all that time to intercept my View of her; nor did I ever see a more profound Attention, than was fix'd in my whole Ship's Company upon the Fireship all the time of her going down; nor was there the Voice of a Man to be heard, but in Praise or Pity of Captain *Macky* and his Company, who appear'd to be going bravely down to a certain Destruction; till she got so close to the *Real*, (without any ill Accident) that the Blast of her blowing up, was mistaken for her having boarded and set her on fire; upon which there was a general Shout of Joy amongst my People: But what a sudden Damp and Concern appear'd, when, the Instant the large Body of black Smoke blew away, there was nothing to be seen of the Fireship but a small Part of her Wreck, floating and smoaking upon the Face of the Water, close under the *Real's* Quarter.

AND therefore, Captain *Stepney's* Testimony as mention'd in the 30th Page of the *Remarks*, instead of contradicting either himself or me (which are both there freely asserted) is a strong Confirmation of my Testimony before mention'd, That, (neither that shining Ornament to the Royal Navy the valiant *Cornewall*, nor his worthy Successor in the Command of) the
Marl-

Marlborough was relieved at all ; nor did any Ship bear down to cover the poor Fire-Ship.

Fifthly, (Pag. 13.) I am said to acknowledge, that I found (or build) my Evidence, with respect to the Winds and Weather, on the Log-Book ; and yet that I refuse to swear to my Journal."

Ans. BOTH which I very freely acknowledge ; the former, because the original Log-book is always esteem'd and ought to be the most authentick Record of Winds and Weather, the Ship's Way, and of all Accidents which are, or ought to be, wrote down immediately by the Mates of the Watches ; whose Abilities and Exactness therein, under the Inspection of the Officer of the Watch and of the Master, are the only Security we have at any time for keeping true Reckonings, to know the Ship's Place in the Sea by, with the great Variety of Observations necessary thereto.

THIS original Log-book of the *Torbay* was in the Court, and all the three Mates were attending, each of them ready to acknowledge and answer for his own Hand-writing, or to any particular Questions relating thereto ; and to prove, that there had been no manner of Alteration whatsoever made in it, as was proved to have been the Case with the Log-books of other Ships.

AND I dare say, That the Author of the *Remarks* was the only Person in the Court (if he was there) that did not hear the Reason I gave to the Court, why I could not swear to my Journal, which was, that it had been transcribed by one of my Writers, from the most perfect Account I could give in my own Hand-writing, and from my own Recollection of the Transactions of that fatal Day; besides what had been written by my Amanuensis, and one of the Mates whom I took from his Quarters, on purpose to keep the more exact Account of the Ship's Way, and of all that passed; and that, before I had Leisure to examine my Journal, and compare it with the original rough Draught of my own Writing, the Original was lost.

Sixthly, (Pag. 13.) The Author of the *Remarks* affirms that I have said, That the Enemy was well form'd when the Admiral bore down to engage; and that I afterwards say, I meant when the Admiral first bore down in the Morning; and that I had before declared, that I did not see the Admiral 'till he bore down to attack the *Spanish* Admiral; and yet, that I take upon me to say positively, the Admiral made the Signal to engage three Hours before he began to engage, whereas Captain *Stepney* says but two Hours. And that I declare, I set the two
extreme

extreme Ends of the Fleet, as soon as I could see them; and that I afterwards say, the Enemy and our Van were too far off for me to take any Notice of them.

Answ. Notwithstanding the Perplexity, with which the Author of the *Remarks* has entangled and confounded my Answers (or Scraps of them) to different Questions, which had no Relation one to the other on my Examination, so as to produce this Appearance of Inconsistency out of them: I apprehend it may appear by any of the well-kept Minutes, that what I did really say to these several Points, was, that the Enemy were well formed at Day-light in the Morning of the 11th of *February*; and that, I then set the two extreme Ends of their Fleet by the Compass, as soon as I could see them; and observed one End of their Line to bear South-West, and the other West by North from the *Torbay*; that Admiral *Mathews's* Flag bore at the same Time about South by West, or South South West, and that the Wind was then at North North East.

THAT from Seven in the Morning to three quarters past Eight, the Admiral bore down upon the Enemy, with the Signal abroad for the Line of Battle a-breast: In all which Time, the *Bri-*

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tish Fleet were only endeavouring to form the Line; but were so far from being form'd, that there was nothing to hinder my seeing the Admiral's Flag.

AND that, the Time I could not see it (for the first Time on the 11th of *February*) was, from the Time of the Admiral's making the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line sailing large, at three quarters past Eight in the Morning, to half an Hour past One in the Afternoon, the Time the Admiral bore down (so as to come open of my Sails) to attack the *Spanish* Admiral; and the Reason why I could not see it in all that Time, was, that the Admiral was a-head of me and I was blinded by my Spritsail; therefore, it is impossible I could ever say, that I saw the Admiral's Ship at the Time when he made the Signal to engage at half an Hour past Ten; as that was within the Time he was hid from me by my Sails: And yet the exact Time of that Signal's being made was no more to be doubted by me, than it could have been if I had seen it; for Notice of it was immediately given, by several of my Petty-Officers and People who saw it, and called down at the same Instant from both the Mast-heads, and were answered by a general Huzza or Shout of Joy, and I saw the Smoke of the Signal-gun as it went to Leeward.

BUT

BUT it is very strange, that the Author should mistake my setting the two extreme Ends of the Enemy's Fleet, for the extreme Ends of our own Fleet: As it must be understood by every Man who knows, or has been rightly informed what a Line of Battle is; That, if the Line had been well formed, I could have seen only the next Ship to me on each Side in the Line a-breast, or the next Ship a-head, and next a-stern, in any other Position; as they in either Case would have obstructed my View, not only of the two extreme Ends of our own Line, but of every other Ship between me and them: And also, as that knowing the bearing of the most distant Ships from the Center of our intended Line, (if it could have been known) could not possibly have been made any manner of Use of.

BUT that setting the extreme Ends of the Enemy's Fleet, and each Ship in ours setting his Adversary, was so absolutely necessary, that, as they were standing a-thwart us through the Trough of the Swell, (though with no more Sail than just enough to keep their Ships under Command, and to give their whole Fleet the better Opportunity to close, in Case there should have been any Openings in their Line) whilst the *British* Fleet were going down upon them with a very large Wind; there is no other Way of knowing or proving, whether we
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did, or did not steer a proper Course down upon the Enemy, (to give them Battle in that most advantageous Manner prescribed and enjoined by the 19th Article of the fighting Instructions) but by constantly observing by the Compass, whether we did, or did not alter the Bearing of the particular Ship in the Enemy's Line, which each Ship of ours steer'd for; their Bearing was therefore, the one Thing needful to be regarded by the whole Division in the Van in particular, as well as by the leading Ship of it, and by the rest of our Fleet in bearing down upon the Enemy.

It will also (I presume) appear by the Minutes, that upon my being ask'd how the *French* Admiral bore from the *Torbay*, when Admiral *Mathews* bore down to attack the *Spanish* Admiral: My Answer was, That as the Enemy had crouded Sail and stretched a-head to the Southward, and had haul'd up from the Time the *British* Admiral made the Signal to engage; The Enemy were got so far a-head by the Time the *British* Admiral bore down to attack their Rear, that I could then see the Enemy's Fleet no further forward, than one or two of the Sternmost of the *French* Ships open of my Head-sails, or to that Effect.

UPON which the Admiral immediately started up, and desired Leave to take Notice to the Court of a Contradiction, which he apprehended he had
observed

observed in my Answers, *viz.* That I had before said, I had set the two extreme Ends of the Enemy's Fleet; and that now I had said, I could not see so far forward as the *French* Admiral who was in the Center of it; which obliged me to explain to the Court, that the Mistake which the Admiral had made in his Observation, must have proceeded from his having blended together, the Time when I set the two extreme Ends of the Enemy's Fleet, which was at Break of Day; with the Time of his bearing down to attack the *Spanish* Admiral, which was at half an Hour past One in the Afternoon.

SEVERAL of the Members of the Court confirmed the Justness of this Explanation by their Minutes, and the Admiral seem'd then to be so fully convinced of it, that I did not expect ever to find it mention'd again.

AND therefore, as the Times abovementioned were all exactly noted by my Watch, which I kept in my Hand all Day, to remark the exact Time of all Accidents; I did, and do take upon me to say positively, that the Admiral made the Signal to engage three Hours before he began to engage.

Seventhly (Pag. 13, and 14.) THE Author says, I affirm, That the Vice-Admiral, when brought to on the tenth at Night, was right a-head of the Admiral, at two Miles distance; and yet

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I,

I, in the *Torbay*, did not take notice of the *Rupert* or any of the Ships in the Rear of the Admiral's Division.

Ans. WHAT is here said to have been affirm'd by me, as to the Admiral's and Vice-Admiral's Situation from one another, happens to be the very contrary to what I did and do affirm, except as to their Distance: And as to my taking notice of the Ships in the Rear of the Admiral's Division; as the Line was to be form'd from the Flag-Ships (which are to be known in the Night by their distinguishing Lights) I minded my own Duty of bringing-to in my proper Station: And neither did, nor do know it to have been my Business, to look after or take any notice of the private Ships in another Division: Even if they were to have been seen and known one from another, which in this Case, is a Matter of great Doubt with me.

8thly, (Pag. 14.) THE Author in going on with his *Remarks* upon my Testimony, says, As to my new-fangled Discipline, for the Admiral's Lying-to, till the Vice-Admiral and his Division had joined him, and form'd the Line; he must leave that to the Consideration of the Court; as it had been fully proved, That Mr. *Lestock* never got the Length of the *Real*, any one Time of that Day; although the *Real* shorten'd Sail to engage, and was so much disabled.

Ans.

Ans. As much new-fangled as the Author of the Remarks would have this Discipline thought to be, for the Admiral to lie-to, till the Vice-Admiral and his Division had joined him and formed the Line ; I must confess, that (after forty Years actual Service in the Royal Navy, and my continual Endeavours in all that Time, to acquire the Knowledge necessary in the Duty of a Commanding Officer, for the Conducting of a Fleet ; and with the Advantages I have had, in serving immediately under several of the greatest and most experienced Flag-Officers of the Age, who have honoured me with their intimate Friendship and Patronage) I do not know any other way of bringing a Fleet into a proper Position for Battle ; and in the first two Years of that Time, I thought myself very able to demonstrate it.

BUT to put it beyond all doubt, from the best Authority (as my own in the present Case as a Controversy, may be thought the worst) *Lediard's Naval History* says, what there is living Evidence to prove ; That This was the very Discipline and Means used by (a General-Officer, whom all the best Judges of his own Time, and since, allow to have been as great a Master of perfect Discipline, as this, or any other Age or Nation ever produced) Admiral *Ruffel*, (afterwards Earl of *Orford*) to form the Line of Battle, with the united Fleets of *England* and *Holland*

under his Command; for in the Engagement with the French Fleet off of *Le Hogue*, 19th May, 1692, “ bore away with his own Ship so far to Leeward, “ as that every one in the Fleet might fetch his “ Wake, or Grain ; and then bringing-to, lay by, “ that so others might have the better Opportunity “ of placing themselves, according as they had been “ before directed.”

AN Officer who saw it says also, that the Notice from Admiral *Ruffel*'s Quarter-Deck, for making the Signal to engage (given to the Officer posted for that Purpose at his Fore-topmast head) was, by a Volley of Musket-Shot into Monsieur *de Tourville* the French Admiral's Ship. Which seems to agree with the well-consider'd Letter of the Instruction, as well as the Advantages of deferring it as long as possible, for the following Reasons. But first it may be necessary to see the Letter of the Instruction: It is the Thirteenth, and stands thus.

“ As soon as the Admiral shall hoist a Red Flag “ on the Flag-Staff at the Foretop-mast-head, and “ fire a Gun, every Ship in the Fleet is to use his “ utmost Endeavours to engage the Enemy, in the “ Order the Admiral has prescribed unto them.

To which, from a just Apprehension (I presume) of the ill Consequences to the Service, which might attend a precisely strict Regard to the Time prescribed

scribed by the Words *As soon as*, from the known Eagerness of the Seamen to begin, and the Difficulty in a single Ship, and therefore the Impossibility of stopping their Hands in a Fleet, when any Ship near has once begun ; Admiral *Mathews* did subjoin, to this Article of the Fighting-Instructions, sign'd by himself, and deliver'd to every Ship under his Command the following Manuscript Addition, *viz.*

“ And strictly to take Care, not to fire before the
“ Signal is given by the Admiral.

A bare Remembrance of which, I suppose might have been sufficient to have prevented any sort of Controversy, about whether the Signal in the present Case, was made three Hours, or two, before the Admiral, or any other Ship in the Fleet was near enough to the Enemy to begin to engage ; and to have spared the Use of that harsh Word, *Contradict*.

AND as the Author of the *Remarks* says, It has been fully proved, that Mr. *Lescock* never got the Length of the *Real*, any one Time of that Day, although the *Real* shorten'd Sail to engage, and was so much disabled : It may be presumed, That it has been altogether as fully proved, that the Reason why Mr. *Lescock* could not possibly get the Length of the *Real*, was, because of the *Real*'s crouding Sail to the Southward (to continue in a close Line with the *French*) from the Time of the *British* Admiral's

miral's making the Signal to engage, to the Time of the Beginning of the Engagement (which was three Hours) with as much Wind as any Man would choose to have in the Time of Engagement ; so that the Fleet sail'd between three and four Miles an Hour, and that thereby the *Real*, as well as the Admiral himself, seem'd to have encreased their Distances from the Vice-Admiral: And that immediately after the Engagement began, when the Admiral and the *Real* appear'd to be six Miles from the Vice-Admiral, the Wind died away ; so that Mr. *Lestock's* Ship, as I judg'd by the *Torbay* which was always the nearest Ship to her, did not at any Time sail more than a Mile and half in an Hour, often less, and had sometimes not Steerage-way ; and therefore could not possibly gain that Distance, altho' the *Real* was so much disabled.

AND therefore, I may venture to depend on the Consent of every impartial Judge, that the Term *New-fangled Discipline*, may with much greater Propriety, be returned back to the Person (whoever he is) that has made me the Compliment of it in the *Remarks* : As the Admiral's making Sail at all, in the Morning of the Day of the Action, till the Vice-Admiral (who was driven by unexpected Currents in the Night, so as to be at Day-light five Miles from him) could, and had come up to join and close the Line of Battle with him, did most certainly (besides depriving himself of such a considerable Part of his Strength)

Strength) new-fangle, or rather for that Time abolish, a very material Part of that excellent Standard of Discipline, establish'd by his Majesty in Council, 7th *January*, 1730, intitled, *Regulations and Instructions relating to his Majesty's Service by Sea*; where, in the second Article of the Chapter of *Colours*, it is enjoin'd, That " If an Officer wearing
 " a Flag or a broad Pendant, shall happen to be
 " slain in Fight with the Enemy, the said Flag or
 " Pendant shall nevertheless continue flying, and
 " not be taken in, whilst the Enemy is in Sight :
 " But the Admiral who commands in Chief, as
 " also the Flag-Officer to whose Squadron or Division he belong'd, shall immediately be acquainted with it; and if it be the Commander in Chief
 " who is kill'd, the next Commanding-Officer is
 " to be forthwith inform'd of it, who shall immediately repair on board the Ship of the deceased
 " Commander, and give the necessary Orders;
 " leaving his own Flag or broad Pendant flying in
 " his own Ship."

AND again, in the 14th Article of the Chapter of *Rank and Command*, in the same Book of Regulations it is enjoin'd; That, " In the Absence of the Captain
 " of any of his Majesty's Ships, the eldest Lieutenant shall have Charge of the Ship, and be answerable for the Duty of the Captain. If there
 " be no Lieutenant, the Master shall command;
 " after him, the second Master; but if by Loss in
 " Battle,

“ Battle, or other Accident, all these Officers shall
 “ be wanting, the Command shall devolve in Suc-
 “ cession upon the Boatswain, Gunner, Car-
 “ penter.”

FOR, if the Admiral had been slain in the first Onset, must not (his) the commanding Ship, and consequently the whole Fleet, have continued under the Direction of the next surviving Officer in that Succession ; even if the Command had devolved upon the Boatswain, Gunner, or Carpenter ; until the Vice-Admiral, then at six Miles Distance, could have got on board the Ship of the deceased Commander, to give the necessary Orders ?

LONG before which Time, great Part of the *British* Fleet might in all Probability have been destroyed, or at least extremely distressed ; for Want of the second Officer's being near enough, to take the chief Command upon him immediately ; and more especially, as the Enemy's Van were not secured from weathering our Van, and thereby bringing them betwixt two Fires.

Ninthly, (Pag. 14, *Remarks*) The Author says, That he cannot omit taking Notice, that altho' I was on the Day of the Engagement call'd to by the Vice-Admiral's Orders, to make more Sail (which he says is a plain Proof, that Mr. *Lestock* saw I had not all the Sail set I ought to have) yet it appears, that

that I then only set my Spritsail, and that my Lower Studding Sails were not set that Day.

Answ. It may be necessary here to take Notice, of what every Man of Observation in that Fleet must have known and seen; and what I presume, must have appear'd to the Court in the Course of the late Trials; That the *Torbay* was by much the worst-failing Ship in that whole Fleet, upon, or any thing near the Wind: But with the Wind from two or three Points Abast the Beam, to right Aft, She would hold Way with most Ships, and gain of some, with equal Sail; which was the Case also, all the Time Captain *Stepney* had her, who succeeded me in that Command.

AND this latter Quality, was the Cause why in going down in the Line a-breast, which was the Form the Fleet were endeavouring to get into, when the Vice-Admiral call'd to me, to make all the Sail I could, (and not "more Sail" as the Author of the Remarks has it), I was then, rather a-head of my Station; the Vice-Admiral being then upon my Starboard Quarter, instead of my being exactly upon his Beam; according to the Order by Signal then abroad: And therefore I apprehended afterwards, as I believe still, that the Vice-Admiral call'd to me, rather in consequence of the Messages which he had himself received by the Admiral's Lieutenants, than

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that I had not somewhat more Sail than enough, then fet, to keep in the Line with him: However, I immediately fet my Spritsail; which I am convinced did no manner of Good, because of the great Swell; and in an Instant afterwards, the Vice-Admiral repeated the Signal for the Line sailing large, and the Rear-Admiral to lead. This was at three Quarters past Eight.

AT half an Hour past Nine, the Signal was made for the Line of Battle one Ship a-head of another; when by this Time the *British* Fleet were so far to Leeward, that we were obliged to haul up, so as to bring the Wind before the Beam; from which Time (and not before) the *Torbay* began to drop a-stern of the Vice-Admiral; and if the Wind had continued so scant, or come further forward, and the Vice-Admiral continued (as he did) to carry all the Sail he could make, the *Torbay* must inevitably (from her bad sailing) have fallen a-stern of the whole Division; especially, as the Ships station'd a-stern of the Vice-Admiral, were all good-sailing Ships, and three of them lately clean'd.

BUT as the Wind came more aft, and at length was brought very far aft upon the Quarter, by the Vice-Admiral's bearing down, when the Admiral bore down to begin the Attack; and by the Vice-Admi-

Admiral's steering for the *Marlborough*, when the Admiral haul'd off from the *Real*; the *Torbay* continued to be the next Ship a-stern of the Vice-Admiral; and had recovered the Distance she had lost (whilst the Wind was scant) so far, that before the Vice-Admiral could have got within Random-shot of any of the Enemy's Ships, the *Torbay* must have been again a-head of him; as it appeared plainly and beyond all Doubt; For that when the Vice-Admiral shorten'd Sail suddenly in the Evening, in obedience to the Admiral's Signal to give over Chace, the *Torbay* was so near the Vice-Admiral, that it was as much as could be done to keep her clear of him, with all her Sails laid a-back for that Purpose.

So that my not being able to keep a-head of the Vice-Admiral all along, was entirely owing to the Fleet's bearing down so far to Leeward, whilst they were endeavouring to form in the Line a-breast, as to be obliged to haul up afterwards so near the Wind in two subsequent Courses, (as above-mentioned at three Quarters past Eight, and at half past Nine,) to correct the Error of the first Course.

As I presume it hath been proved to have also been One Cause, why the Van of the *British* Fleet did not (after the Loss of so much Ground) get up to engage the Van of the Enemy's Fleet; nor our Center, to engage their Center; nor any one Ship

In our whole Fleet to get up into her proper Station with regard to the Enemy ; except it shall appear that the leading Ships of our Van were in their Stations, for I know nothing of them.

BUT every body knows, that the Rear-Admiral, who commanded our Van, instead of engaging the Enemy's Van with his Division, did engage the *French* Admiral, who commanded in the Center of the Enemy's Fleet ; and that the Admiral, who commanded in chief, and was accordingly in the Center of the *British* Fleet, did engage the *Spanish* Admiral, who commanded the Rear Division of the Enemy's Fleet.

So that the Vice-Admiral and his Division, if they could have got up, to have closed the Line with our Center Division, would have had no Ship to engage with ; for the very same Reason, that (as it happened) the Enemy's Van had no Ships of our's to engage with them ; notwithstanding it appears, by the Sentence pronounced by the Court-Martial on Vice-Admiral *Leffock* ; That “ If the Vice-Admiral's whole Division had been absolutely away, and “ the four Stern-most Ships of the Enemy (who “ were of no more Service in the Engagement to “ the Enemy, than the Vice-Admiral's Division was “ to his Majesty's Fleet) had also been excluded ; “ the rest of his Majesty's Fleet, would have still remained superior to the rest of the combined Fleet,

FOR

FOR (as I presume it hath been fully proved also, that) had the *British* Fleet been form'd in a Line, and afterwards steer'd down upon the Enemy (as the nineteenth Article of the Fighting Instructions expressly requires and directs) the Wind had always continued large enough for the *Torbay* in one proper Course, to have kept in her Station next a-head of the Vice-Admiral, and, not improbably to have spared him some Sail.

THE nineteenth Article of the Fighting Instructions above-mention'd, enjoins, that " If the Admiral and his Fleet have the Wind of the Enemy, " and they have stretch'd themselves in Line of " Battle; the Van of the Admiral's Fleet, is to " steer with the Van of the Enemy's, and there to " engage him.

As to my lower Studding-sails, which the Author of the Remarks says very truly were not set any time that Day; the Reason is, they would not stand.

First, Because at our hauling up into a Line of Battle a-head (for before that, I did not want them) we were, as above-mentioned, obliged to haul so near the Wind, that no lower Studding-sail could be made to stand; even if there had been no considerable Swell; but the Swell was so great, that afterwards, when the Wind was far enough ast, to have

have allow'd of their standing, if it had not been for the Swell, the Boom could not be kept out of the Water, without being top'd up much too high to do its Office ; nor could any one of the Lower Ports be kept open.

AND in the next Place, the Flapping of the Topmast Studding-sail, by the Ship's pitching and stamping against the Head-swell, made the Boom bend like a Bow : And therefore, when the Wind was brought further aft, the outer Halliards of the low Studding-sail must inevitably have carried away the Topmast Studding-sail Boom, and I must thereby have lost the Use of my Topmast Studding-sail, which I carried till the Evening.

AND yet, as the proper low Studding-sail could not be set for these Reasons ; that nothing might be left untried, I caused a Fore-stay-sail to be hoisted as a Low-studding-sail, and the Tack to be haul'd out to a Boom rigg'd out from the Fore-chains : But this Sail also flapp'd so much, and threw so much of the Wind out of the Fore-sail, (a Sail of a much more steady Draught) that, as it apparently did more Harm than Good, I was therefore obliged to order it to be haul'd down again.

10thly, (Pag. 14.) THE Author goes on to say, I had a Reef at that Time in my Fore-sail, and Mizzen-topfail, and was sailing with the Wind

two

two or three Points abaft the Beam. As for my Reasons for keeping the Reefs in, he fubmits them to the Confideration of the Court ; and only begs Leave to remark, That as my Ship was to Windward of the Enemy, there could be no great Danger of Fire lodging in thofe Sails.

Anfw. As to the Reef in my Fore-fail, and that in my Mizen-top-fail ; I had neither acted like a Seaman nor an Officer, if I had not taken, and kept them in.

First, as the Courfes were by juft fo much too deep for the Low-Mafts, (which had been shorten'd at *Portsmouth*, contrary to my Inclination and Opinion, after I had been a Voyage to the *West-Indies* in the Ship) that, they would never ftand fair without a Reef: And the Mizen-top-fail was juft as much too deep for its Maft, that it likewife would never ftand fair without a Reef.

AND therefore, as thefe Sails when they had a Reef in, fo exactly fitted the Mafts ; I fhould have cut them off at the Reefs, to make them ftand always fair, and to fave the Trouble of taking thofe Reefs in, and letting them out to dry, as often as it might be neceffary : But that the Sails would thereby have been spoil'd for the Ufe of any other Eighty Gun Ships, in cafe any of them fhould have
been

been in need of a Supply of Sails, of those Denominations.

NOR, as these Sails did spread, the very same Width and Depth with a Reef in, as they would have done, if they had been cut off at the Reef (to make them fit for the Ship's Masts) were they at all to be esteem'd Reef'd Sails; but whole Sails, exactly fit for that Ship's Masts.

AND moreover, besides that of my having been in my early Days instructed, and perfectly convinced by Experience ever since, that the flatter a Sail is spread, the better it draws, as to the Ship's sailing: Another Reason for the absolute Necessity of Reefing, arose, from our seeing, when we weigh'd from *Hieres-Bay*, that we were immediately going into Action; when every Sail in the Ship should be spread as flat as possible, to prevent lodging Fire.

THUS far I had gone, in giving my Reasons for taking in those Reefs, before the Fleet weigh'd from *Hieres-Bay*, and for keeping them in on the Day of the Action; When the Court forbade me to answer to any Questions about my Reefs: Apprehending (as I presume) either that all such Questions were of a captious nature, or, were not pertinent to the Matter before them.

OTHER-

OTHERWISE, as I had nothing to conceal, I should have gone on to have given the same Reasons, for the Necessity of taking and keeping them in, (from my Experience in Battle) as I had given in the preceding Trial; which were, That, as in the *Weymouth*, at the taking of the *Thetis*, a *French Ship* of War, in the Year 1711; being engaged according to my Captain's constant Rule and Practice for Distance, (between single Ships, and against Forts) viz.

“ To singe them with the Flame, that we might
 “ not lose the Shot; ” as that Action happen'd in the Night, I saw Streams of Fire, continually running along the Top-sails for four Hours together, from the Swivel-Guns and Small-Arms in the Tops; and along the Foresail, from the Wads of our own great Guns and the Enemy's, and from our Small-Arms, upon the Forecastle: But those Sails being spread perfectly flat, in a Seaman-and-Officer-like-manner, the Fire all blew out of them into the Sea, which otherwise must have lodged, and set the Sails on fire: And therefore, spreading all Sails as flat as possible, and particularly in preparing for Action, hath been carefully regarded by me as a Matter of the utmost Consequence, ever since.

AND the Necessity of this Caution, hath been more fully confirm'd in me since that Time, by seeing Canvas of the very same sort, set on fire by the single Flake of a Wad: When I was myself (very happily) made the Instrument of Providence

(by the timely Discovery of it) to prevent the Ship (*Launceston*) from being thereby burnt in the Sea, where every body in her must have inevitably perish'd.

AND that we had sufficient Reason to expect to use our small Arms, in the Action off of *Toulon*, could not be doubted by any body that was there, after we saw the Enemy prepared for boarding, by their whimsical Bridges; which we had so long had Notice of, as to allow us time to make conceal'd Nets, to catch their Men in, if the Water had been smooth enough for them to have attempted it.

AND as to the Reason which the Author concludes this Remark with, *viz.* That as my Ship was to Windward of the Enemy, there could be no great Danger of Fire lodging in those Sails; if the Author means only from the Enemy's Fire, I acknowledge, that whilst my Ship continued to be to Windward of the Enemy, there was no great Danger of their Fire lodging in my Sails: But it was from the Fire of my own Guns upon the Forecastle, and from that of the small Arms in the Mizzen-top, that I apprehended the setting my Fore-sail and Mizzen-top-sail on Fire, if they had not been spread perfectly flat, as all the rest of my Sails were.

For

FOR as the Lee-part of every Ship's Sails are always to Leeward of her own Fire, whilst they are full, and she in a proper Position for Battle, whether the Ship herself is to Windward or to Leeward of the Enemy, (except the Mizzen, when the Enemy is to Leeward): And the Foot of the Fore-sail is always in certain Danger of being set on fire, by the very Flame of the Guns upon the Forecastle being fired immediately and directly into it, as well as the Topsails are, by the Flame of the small Arms in the Tops, when the Ship is to Windward of the Enemy, without some proper Provision and constant Care to prevent it; even when the Sails are not too deep for the Masts.

WHEREAS in the Ship to Leeward of the Enemy, as the Flame of her Guns is discharged directly from her Sails, (and against the Course of the Wind) she is hardly in any manner of Danger of any other Fire lodging in her Sails, than from the Flakes of her own Wads, and those of the Enemy's, as in the Case of the *Weymouth* above-mention'd.

AND therefore, the Author is here again so unlucky to his own Purpose, as to offer the very Reason against the Necessity of reefing my Fore-sail and Mizzen-top-sail, which is the very strongest

that could be given for it, viz. " As my Ship was
" to Windward of the Enemy.

Eleventhly, (Pag. 14, 15.) THE Author says, That surely it must appear impossible, but that I must know and see, that the Vice-Admiral shorten'd Sail for the *Torbay* to get up; which Fact is acknowledged under Mr. *Lescock's* own Hand,

WHATEVER the Vice-Admiral might have had Thoughts of doing, I know not; but that I know, saw, or believe that he shorten'd sail for the *Torbay*, I absolutely deny: And that he did not, seems to prove itself, by his not letting me get a-head of him with all the Sail it was possible for me to make: But lest this sort of Proof should not be thought sufficient, the Author has himself furnish'd me with legal positive Proof, in flat Contradiction to his own Suggestion, from the Testimony of Lieutenant *Burgefs*; who, (Pag. 15 of the *Remarks*) is said upon Oath to " assert, That the
" Vice-Admiral did not shorten sail on the 11th,
" for the *Torbay* to get into her Station."

AND as Mr. *Burgefs* was quarter'd in the Vice-Admiral's Main-top, and was either there, or upon the Main-top-gallant-yard the whole time, and was (as it happen'd) an Officer meerly of Observation, of whatever pass'd within his View, but more particularly of what Sail was carried by the Vice-Admiral, as the Care of the After-sails was Part of his

his immediate Charge ; his Testimony may very probably be thought to be more exact, in this Particular, than that of any other Person in the whole Fleet ; except the Quarter-master at the Cond and the Timoniers of the *Torbay*, whose Eyes (as well as my own, and a Multitude of other Officers) as we steer'd by the Vice-Admiral's Ship, were always upon her ; and who all saw, that the Vice-Admiral by carrying all the Sail he could make, not only got and kept a-head of the *Torbay*, but also that none of the Ships station'd a-stern of the Vice-Admiral (though they were reputed good sailing Ships, and three of them lately clean'd) could possibly get near enough to the Vice-Admiral, to be in their proper Stations ; the nearest of them, by at least twice, and the sternmost by three or four times the computed Distance that the *Torbay* was dropp'd a-stern of the Vice-Admiral, when she was at the greatest Distance from him ; which Distance the *Torbay* (as abovemention'd) had recover'd within two or three times her own Length, when the Admiral made the Signal to give over Chace in the Evening.

THEREFORE upon the Whole, as the Author of the *Remarks* speaks sometimes in the Person of the Admiral, and sometimes speaks of the Admiral as a third Person ; I cannot persuade myself but that the Admiral, either by his ill State of bodily Health or Disturbance of Mind, whilst his Life
and

and Honour seemed to be both at Stake (under so heavy a Charge) hath been obliged to commit the compiling of these *Remarks* to some Person, who was very unequal to the Task of doing the Admiral, or his Cause any sort of Credit thereby; nor can I apprehend, that the Admiral can have been at Leisure even to revise and correct them, otherwise they could not have gone to the Press with such glaring Errors and Inconsistencies, as could not possibly have escaped the Notice of an Officer of the Admiral's Experience and particular Delicacy.

I HAVE therefore only spoke to such particular Parts of them, as seemed necessary to be explained or refuted by me, and have herein quoted no other Authority than what the Author of the *Remarks* has himself furnished me with, except the General printed Instructions, and *Lediard's* Naval History.

I am

S I R,

Stratford in Essex,
Nov. 10, 1746.



Your most obedient

humble Servant,

JOHN GASCOIGNE.

To PERRY MAYNE, Esq; Rear-Admiral
of the Red Squadron of his Majesty's
Fleet, Commander in Chief of his Majesty's
Ships and Vessels in the River of
Thames and Medway, &c. and President
of the late Court-Martial held at Deptford.

